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 1 
Inconsistencies in the Treatment of Physician-Assisted Suicide & Passive Euthanasia 
Arielle Simkins 
Introduction: 
 Philosophy is often used to rationalize and justify human behavior. Philosopher James 
Rachels writes that the distinction between the acceptability of active and passive euthanasia is 
that “it is permissible, at least in some cases, to withhold treatment and allow a patient to die, but 
it is never permissible to take any direct action designed to kill the patient.”1 The disparity is one 
between action and inaction.
2
 
Rachels illustrates the difference using an anecdote of Smith and Jones, both of whom 
will inherit a large fortune upon the death of their respective six-year-old cousins.
3
 Rachels 
examines two situations, one in which Smith drowns the child and proceeds to make it look 
accidental, and another in which Jones intends to drown the child, but as he enters the bathroom, 
the child slips and falls face first into the bathtub.
4
 Jones watches the child, unconscious from his 
fall, as he drowns, and does nothing to stop the event.
5
 Although these circumstances yielded the 
same result, Smith is both legally and morally more guilty than Jones because of his direct action 
to kill the child.  
Nevertheless, in further examination of the situation, Rachels denies that it is permissible 
for Jones to defend himself because he did not kill the child, but merely allowed him to die.
6
 The 
difference is a moral quibble; engaging in a positive action to kill an individual versus an 
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 2 
inaction letting the individual die leaves the actor in the morally equivalent position.
7
 Despite the 
moral conformity of the two circumstances, medical professionals are in the precise position to 
differentiate between their actions and inactions for but one reason: the law. In doing so, there 
has been a division of euthanasia into active and passive. However, this ignores the category of 
physician-assisted suicide, which implicates legal and ethical principles of both active and 
passive euthanasia.  
These forms of euthanasia are morally indistinguishable as they produce an identical 
result: they bring about death. This is a moral wrong. However, no form of euthanasia may be 
more or less wrong than another, as irrespective of intent, the ultimate act in fact hastens death. 
Therefore, physician-assisted suicide is no different from any acceptable means of hastening 
death, such as passive euthanasia.  
This paper will explore the background of euthanasia, including the three common forms 
of such treatment. Ultimately, despite the various arguments of distinction, no form of euthanasia 
can be justified as more or less permissible than another. Section I will provide a brief history of 
the right to die and physician-assisted suicide in the United States and will discuss Oregon’s 
successful implementation of Death with Dignity legislation. It will then provide a background 
of the American Medical Association’s ethical perspective in the area of end of life care. Finally, 
Section II will argue that physician-assisted suicide is morally equivalent to passive euthanasia. 
In light of this fact, arguments in favor of treatment termination are applied in an inconsistent 
manor when analyzing physician-assisted suicide. 
Background: 
There are three distinct and recognized forms of assistance in ending life. Active 
euthanasia occurs when a physician takes an affirmative action that deliberately causes the death 
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 3 
of a patient.
8
 This is perhaps the least controversial of the categories, as it is universally 
impermissible in the United States. The second category, passive euthanasia, involves a 
physician withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from a patient, which ultimately 
results in death.
9
 Finally, there is physician-assisted suicide, which is sometimes referred to as 
physician “aid in dying.” In this case, though the physician does not participate actively in the 
suicide, he or she provides the necessary medical means by which the patient may end his or her 
life.
10
 However, the distinction among these forms of assistance in order to legally and ethically 
justify passive euthanasia is wrongfully relied upon. 
I. History: 
 The legalization of physician-assisted suicide represents a relatively recent movement in 
the United States, with advocacy and legislation only attaining momentum and public support in 
the 1990s.
11
 However, in order to appreciate the controversy at hand, it is important to 
distinguish, as law and ethics have, among the designated forms of assistance in ending life and 
to understand the history of the abstract right to die.  
A. The Right to Die:  
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 4 
 The medicalization of death required the legalization of passive euthanasia, which 
preceded in modern times the call for physician-assisted suicide.
12
 In 1975, 21-year-old Karen 
Ann Quinlan suffered irreparable brain damage during a period of respiratory failure.
13
 As a 
result, Quinlan’s condition was that of a persistent vegetative state.14 The ultimate issue before 
the New Jersey Court was whether or not her co-guardian parents could act as surrogate decision 
makers in order to request termination of Quinlan’s life-sustaining ventilator.15 In its answer, the 
Court conclusively stated that a competent person has the right to refuse medical intervention, up 
to and including the termination of life-sustaining treatment.
16
 This derived from an implied right 
to privacy grounded in the Constitution and recognized by the United States Supreme Court in 
the context of pregnancy termination and the right to control what happens in and to one’s 
body.
17
 While the State has an interest in preserving life, the court found that this interest 
weakens and the right to privacy increases in proportion to the invasiveness of the treatment.
18
 
Therefore, according to the New Jersey Supreme Court, competent individuals have a 
Constitutionally protected right to refuse medical treatment in the form of a respirator and, when 
appropriate, surrogate decisions makers may act with substituted judgment on behalf of an 
incompetent individual.
19
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 5 
 Quinlan, however, was merely the beginning of a nationwide pursuit in asserting the right 
to treatment termination on behalf of incompetent individuals. Only ten years later, another 
patient’s right to refuse treatment was decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court. 20  Claire 
Conroy, however, was not in a persistent vegetative state.
21
 Instead, Conroy was terminally ill 
and had recently become incompetent.
22
 In light of her condition, her nephew, as her surrogate 
decision maker, sought to terminate the artificial nutrition and hydration provided to her.
23
 Again 
the Court found that an individual has a right to control his or her own body, “free from all 
restraint or interference of others,”24 grounded in the right to privacy and the common-law right 
to self-determination.
25
 Ultimately, the Court expanded the class of eligible incompetent persons 
for whom surrogates seek treatment termination to include those with terminal illness.
26
 In doing 
so, it established subjective and objective tests requiring clear and convincing evidence before a 
terminally ill patient’s treatment may be withheld or withdrawn.27 These tests were developed to 
protect a patient’s right to bodily integrity and demand clear evidence of a patient’s wish to 
terminate treatment,
28
 or a balancing of the burdens and benefits of a patient’s prolonged life.29  
 While the New Jersey Supreme Court and numerous state courts over the next decade 
recognized a right grounded in informed consent to demand the removal of artificial nutrition 
and hydration, the issue did not reach the United States Supreme Court until 1990, in the case of 
Nancy Cruzan.
30
 Cruzan, like Quinlan, was in a persistent vegetative state and her surrogate 
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 6 
sought to remove the life-sustaining treatment she was receiving.
31
 The Supreme Court, 
reiterating the finding of the Missouri Supreme Court, discussed the right at issue in terms of 
liberty grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment rather than a right to privacy.
32
 This liberty 
interest granted individuals the right to refuse medical treatment.
33
 The Court, however, found 
that the Constitution does not prevent a state from implementing a clear and convincing evidence 
standard requiring the subjective wishes of the patient as a prerequisite to treatment 
termination.
34
 
 Cumulatively, these cases represent the beginning of a right to die movement. Through 
these instances of passive euthanasia, the Supreme Courts of New Jersey and of the United States 
have found that surrogate decision makers may make treatment termination decisions on behalf 
of incompetent patients, and when applicable, termination is a legally and ethically acceptable 
medical practice.
35
 At the Supreme Court level, the interest in patient self-determination at issue 
has been based on the 14
th
 Amendment’s liberty interest as well as the doctrine of informed 
consent, but only by means of dictum.
36
 Through the protections discussed, it is permissible for a 
patient to remove and or refuse life-sustaining treatment, specifically in the form of artificial 
respiration or nutrition and hydration.
37
  
B. Physician-Assisted Suicide 
i. In Federal Courts 
The Supreme Court soon faced Constitutional challenges against bans on physician-
assisted suicide. While the Cruzan court provided that it was in the states’ discretion to 
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determine standards for removing life-sustaining treatment, it only briefly discussed the state 
interests in the preservation of life, the prevention of suicide, the protection of innocent third 
parties and the “maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical profession.” 38  Within a 
decade of the Cruzan decision, the Court confronted the particular roles, duties, and privileges 
physicians have in end of life decisions. 
In 1997, several physicians challenged a New York State ban on aiding in committing or 
attempting to commit suicide.
39
 The challenge was one of equal protection and the Court of 
Appeals agreed, 
Despite the assisted-suicide ban’s apparent general applicability, ‘New York law 
does not treat equally all competent persons who are in the final stages of fatal 
illness and wish to hasten their deaths,’ because ‘those in the final stages of 
terminal illness who are on life-support systems are allowed to hasten their deaths 
by directing the removal of such systems; but those who are similarly situated, 
except for the previous attachment of life-sustaining equipment, are not allowed 
to hasten death by self-administering prescribed drugs.
40
 
 
The Supreme Court rejected this position.
41
 It found that, for purposes of causation and intent, 
assisting suicide and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment were separate and distinct.
42
 It 
asserted, “when a patient refuses life-sustaining treatment, he dies from an underlying fatal 
disease or pathology; but if a patient ingests lethal medication prescribed by a physician, he is 
killed by that medication.”43 The physician’s affirmative act, which the Court saw as the cause of 
death, relative to the physician’s omission or inaction in the withdrawal of life-sustaining 
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treatment, done to comport with the patient’s right to refuse treatment, became the crux of 
defining the distinction.
44
 
Fundamentally, this difference is one of intent, and can be best illustrated in the nuanced 
example of palliative care that potentially hastens death.
45
 The legal and ethical justifications for 
palliative care come from the principle of double effect.
46
 Double effect exists in circumstances 
in which palliative care is provided despite the foreseeability that it may hasten death, so long as 
the intention of the treatment is to relieve pain and not to cause death.
47
 In these circumstances, 
the decision to provide such treatment is morally and legally permissible.
48
 This suggests that 
intent is the difference between permissible treatment and assisted suicide. 
The Court also distinguished between the right to refuse treatment and the right to hasten 
death, the latter of which is not provided any protection.
49
 In emphasizing these two distinctions, 
the Court found that the classes of individuals with terminal illness were not similarly situated to 
those requiring life-supporting measures.
50
 Therefore the equal protection argument failed and 
the New York statutes did not infringe on patients’ Constitutional rights.51 
In a companion case from Washington State, the Supreme Court also rejected a due 
process argument to a ban on physician-assisted suicide.
52
 This examination included an 
understanding that individuals are entitled to “heightened protection against government 
interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.”53 The due process question 
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45
 Quill, 521 U.S. at 802 (“The law has long used actors’ intent or purpose to distinguish between two acts that may 
have the same result.”). 
46
 Id.  
47
 Id. at 807 n.11. 
48
 Id. 
49
 Id. at 807. 
50
 Id.  
51
 Quill, 521 U.S. at 807. 
52
 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
53
 Id.  
 9 
analyzed whether individuals have a right to die based on a liberty interest, and if so, whether the 
right to commit suicide could be inferred from that interest.
54
 Again, the Court highlighted the 
difference between physician-assisted suicide and withdrawing or withholding care.
55
 While the 
right to die may have been assumed in the latter circumstance, the Court neither foresaw nor 
intended for that right to be extended into a right to commit suicide, let alone the right to 
assistance in doing so.
56
 Additionally, the Washington legislation at issue stated that the 
“withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment…shall not, for any purpose, constitute a 
suicide.”57 In finding that the state interests implicated by assisted suicide were legitimate and 
the law was rationally related to those interests, the Court did not deem it necessary to weigh the 
interests of the individuals against those of the state.
58
 The ban on physician-assisted suicide did 
not violate the due process clause of the Constitution.
59
 
ii. Federal Legislation 
The complexity and exposure of end of life decision-making issues continue to grow in 
the courts and Congress. Responding to the attempts of several states to pass assisted suicide 
legislation, Congress enacted law prohibiting the use of any federal financial assistance in 
support or promotion of assisted suicide, euthanasia, or mercy killing.
60
 Congress enacted this 
law shortly after Oregon passed a ballot measure allowing assisted suicide.
61
 In light of this, it 
was Congress’ intent to prevent the use of federal funding in such circumstances,62 perhaps as a 
means to detach itself from implicitly condoning the states’ decisions. As of 2013, a small 
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number of individual states permit the practice of assisted suicide,
63
 but the proposal for Death 
with Dignity legislation in others is growing.
64
 
Subsection (a) of the federal law restricts the use of federal health care service funding 
from providing “any health care item or service furnished for the purpose of causing, or for the 
purpose of assisting in causing, the death of any individual, such as by suicide, euthanasia, or 
mercy killing.”65 However, it makes a familiar and explicit qualification in subsection (b) that 
provides that this law “shall not be construed to affect…the withholding or withdrawing of 
medical treatment or medical care [and] the withholding or withdrawing of nutrition or 
hydration.”66 Here, Congress, like the Supreme Court, makes a clear distinction between assisted 
suicide and passive euthanasia.
67
 
Despite Congressional disapproval, four states have embraced initiatives to allow 
physician-assisted suicide, three through legislation and one by case law.
68
 In 1994, Oregon 
became the first state to allow direct physician involvement.
69
 Following suit, Washington 
enacted highly regulated legislation in a similar fashion to Oregon, while Vermont initiated a far 
more lax statute for end of life decision-making involving physician-assisted suicide.
70
 Montana, 
as of 2013, is the fourth state allowing physician-assisted suicide.
71
 However, the state 
acknowledges assisted-suicide as a defense to homicide, rather than an affirmatively permissible 
                                                 
63
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action.
72
 In the interest of effectively analyzing Death with Dignity legislation, this paper will 
examine that with the longest history, namely Oregon. 
C. Success in Oregon 
Despite the Death with Dignity initiative’s approval by Oregon voters in 1994, it was not 
until 1997 that the Act went into effect.
73
 Almost ten years later, the United States Attorney 
General challenged the law and asserted that “using controlled substances to assist suicide [was] 
not a legitimate medical practice and that dispensing or prescribing them for this purpose is 
unlawful” under federal law. 74  However, the Supreme Court found that the Controlled 
Substances Act “conveys an unwillingness to cede medical judgments to an executive office who 
lacks medical expertise.” 75  Additionally, Congress did not intend to alter the federal-state 
balance and grant officials such as the Attorney General the far-reaching power to interpret and 
use federal law to prosecute physicians for actions that were permissible under state law.
76
 Thus, 
the Court upheld the Oregon Death with Dignity Act and medical treatment provided in 
compliance with the Act continues to be permissible. 
The Oregon Death with Dignity Act provides that adults who are at least 18 years of age, 
competent, and suffering from a terminal illness may voluntarily make an informed decision to 
request “medication for the purpose of ending his or her life in a humane and dignified 
                                                 
72
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manner.”77 The qualifications for eligibility under the Act are explicitly provided and, along with 
the responsibilities of physicians, act as safeguards for the initiative.
78
 
i. Oregon Safeguards 
Physicians must abide by a number of safeguards under the Death with Dignity Act in 
order to protect themselves against liability, but also to protect patients’ interests and prevent 
potential abuses such as involuntary euthanasia.
79
 Among their responsibilities, physicians must 
determine whether a patient has a terminal illness, is competent, and has made an informed and 
voluntary decision.
80
 Moreover, the physician must refer the patient to a second physician in 
order to confirm each of these conclusions.
81
 Additionally, the physician must consider whether 
the patient may be suffering from a psychological disorder or impairment and refer the patient to 
counseling, if appropriate.
82
 This safeguard is of particular importance, as research shows “many 
people who request physician-assisted suicide withdraw that request if their depression and pain 
are treated.”83  These procedures ensure that the patient has an appropriate diagnosis and is 
making an acceptable autonomous decision. 
There are also measures in place to ensure the patient retains his or her autonomy at all 
times.
84
 These include a mandatory waiting period
85
 and the right to rescind the request for 
medication.
86
 Requiring the patient to wait fifteen days between the first oral request for 
medication and the formal written request ensures that the individual is given the time to reflect 
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to rescind the request at any time and in any manner, and offer the patient an opportunity to rescind at the end of the 
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on whether his or her decision is in fact one with which he or she is ultimately comfortable. The 
same sentiment is echoed in continuing to remind the patient that he or she may cease with the 
process of attaining the medication at any time. Notwithstanding this mandatory waiting period, 
the patient is in no way mandated or forced to utilize the prescription even after a pharmacist has 
filled it. Upon choosing to take the medication that is provided, it must be self-administered.
87
 In 
so doing, the patient is the ultimate actor in causing his or her own death and the physician is, at 
the very least, one step removed from the process. 
While the procedures above act as safeguards for patients’ interest as well as for 
physicians to avoid criminal and malpractice liability, there is an even more substantial 
regulation within Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act that shields the physician from participation 
entirely, if so desired.
88
 The Act provides immunity for any physician who does not wish to 
participate in the provision of medication that will end a patient’s life.89 Therefore, the patient’s 
ability to exercise his or her autonomy does not and cannot exceed the physician’s identical right. 
There is explicitly no duty placed on a physician to aid a patient in the process of assisted 
suicide.
90
 Therefore, both the patients and physicians who choose to avail themselves of the Act 
consent not only to the premise of the Act, but also to the regulations and safeguards it provides.  
ii. Oregon Statistics of Effectiveness 
Oregon data provides that the average patient seeking relief under the Death with Dignity 
Act is a sixty-nine year old, well-educated, Caucasian individual who is privately insured.
91
 This 
individual has a 75.3 percent chance of suffering from a malignant neoplasm and his or her 
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greatest concerns include losing personal autonomy and the ability to engage in activities that 
make life enjoyable.
92
 1,050 individuals have received prescriptions under the Death with 
Dignity Act since its effective date of 1997, but only 673 of these individuals have died from 
ingesting the medication.
93
 This disparity, however, does not denote instances of failure of the 
medication. Instead, it comprises individuals who chose not to take the medication, or 
individuals for whom results were not made available. There have only been six patients in the 
history of the Act that have regained consciousness after ingesting the lethal medication.
94
 
Of the 115 patients for whom DWDA prescriptions were written during 2012, 67 
(58.3%) ingested the medication; 66 died from ingesting the medication, and one 
patient ingested the medication but regained consciousness before dying of 
underlying illness and is therefore not counted as a DWDA death. The patient 
regained consciousness two days following ingestion, but remained minimally 
responsive and died six days following ingestion.
95
  
 
Regaining consciousness aside, there were no reported complications in 2012 and only twenty-
two instances of complications, namely regurgitation, since physician-assisted suicide became 
available. Though these six instances of regaining consciousness are distressing, they also 
establish that there is an incredibly low rate of side effects and ineffectiveness in the treatment. 
 In terms of physician characteristics, in 2012, sixty-one physicians wrote the 115 
prescriptions that were provided to patients under the Death with Dignity Act.
96
 However, in 
2005, the last annual report available that included a breakdown of physician characteristics, the 
state found that seventy-four percent of physicians who wrote a prescription for lethal 
medication did so only once during that statistical year.
97
 While this breakdown is not available 
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 15 
for the 2012 year, the range of prescriptions written was between one and ten per physician.
98
 
Additionally, the number of years in practice was also unavailable in the 2012 report. However, 
in 2005, the median was twenty-six years, with a range from three to fifty-five years.
99
 These 
statistics establish that physicians are generally conservative in prescribing lethal medication, as 
intended by the Act, and they are not availing themselves and their patients to the Act without 
experience in their field. 
D. American Medical Association Ethics 
Many physicians and physician ethical societies argue that physician-assisted suicide is 
“fundamentally incompatible with the physician’s role as healer.”100 In this argument, opponents 
often cite the Hippocratic Oath, as it provides that the physician shall neither harm a patient nor 
give him or her a lethal drug despite such a request.
101
 Arguments on behalf of physicians and 
physician groups often focus on the intent of the medical professional and the ethical 
implications associated with aiding in suicide. 
The Council on Ethics and Judicial Affairs (CEJA) of the American Medical Association 
(AMA) has stated explicitly that it is unethical and therefore impermissible for a physician to 
engage in acts of “physician-assisted suicide” or “euthanasia.”102 The CEJA defines physician-
assisted suicide as that which occurs “when a physician facilitates a patient’s death by providing 
the necessary means and/or information to enable the patient to perform the life-ending act,” and 
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euthanasia as “administration of a lethal agent…for the purpose of relieving the patient’s 
intolerable and incurable suffering.” 103  However, the organization finds it permissible for a 
physician to withhold or withdraw treatment from a patient, thereby causing death.
104
 Analogous 
to the legal distinction, the AMA derives permissibility from intent.  
i. The Principle of Double Effect 
The AMA, by means of the CEJA, rationalizes what may otherwise be considered active 
euthanasia through the principle of double effect.
105
 In an identical description as the one 
accepted by law, the AMA provides that “palliative treatment that may hasten a patient’s death is 
permissible.” 106  This premise, as stated previously, results in a philosophical question of 
intent.
107
 There are four ethical conditions that must be met in order for a physician action to be 
permissible:  
[T]he nature of the action must be good or morally neutral and, thus, not 
prohibited; a good effect or consequence must be intended to flow from the action, 
and not a bad or evil consequence; the good or positive result must not be used as 
a direct casual [sic] consequence of the evil result; and the good or positive result 
must be proportionate to any evil result.
108
 
 
These guidelines dictate that the action taken cannot be morally wrong; the physician must 
intend to relieve pain and not to cause death; death cannot be the means by which the physician 
intends to relieve pain; and the relief of pain must be proportionate to the near certainty that the 
action will result in death.
109
 Therefore, in a circumstance where palliative treatment is intended 
to relieve pain, and not to hasten death, but the treatment’s effect may in fact hasten death, the 
treatment plan is ethically permissible. The double effect of a treatment does not prevent the 
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physician from engaging in a particular act, despite knowledge that, for example, particular 
medication may result in decreased respiration and ultimate death.
110
 
 Said differently, the foundation of double effect can be described in terms of Immanuel 
Kant’s means and end logic.111 Kant’s framework proposes that human actions should not be a 
means to an end, but always an end in and of themselves.
112
 Based on this premise, the sequences 
of events in the treatment decision, as well as the intent, are critical to the principle of double 
effect. In the event that there are two results from a treatment modality, so long as the 
permissible outcome—to treat pain—is the intent of the treatment and the end that is sought, and 
not the impermissible outcome—to hasten death—then the treatment is ethically justifiable. This 
remains true despite the foreseeability of the impermissible outcome because the treatment is an 
end in itself to relieve pain, not merely a means to hasten death. More simply, death cannot be 
the means of alleviating the patient’s pain. However, if death results from the means of attaining 
pain relief, then this double effect will be ethically tolerable because the physician’s intent does 
not treat treatment as a means to an end. Ethically, mirroring the accepted premises of the 
Supreme Court, the AMA provides physicians a defense for treatment decisions that hasten death, 
despite the correlation between this result and euthanasia.
113
 
ii. The AMA on Passive Euthanasia 
The CEJA maintains that withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment is not 
attributable to the physician, and instead is the result of the patient’s or the patient’s proxy’s 
intentional and permissible interference with medical care.
114
 Of utmost importance in this 
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ethical distinction is the principle of self-determination.
115
 In this, “individuals are the best 
judges of their own interests”116 and therefore should be permitted to make decisions regarding 
their medical care, especially in circumstances that may result in death. Self-determination has 
been an important focus of moral, ethical, and legal considerations in end of life decision making. 
However, there is a “fundamental difference between refusing life-sustaining treatment and 
demanding life-ending treatment.”117 The AMA, perhaps properly, reduces self-determination to 
a right to “accept or refuse offered interventions, but not to decide what should be offered.”118 
Although a patient has a legally protected right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment, this 
does not implicate a duty on a physician to participate in ending the life of the patient. When a 
patient refuses life-sustaining treatment, his or her underlying disease takes its natural course and 
is the ultimate cause of death.
119
 While it is impermissible for a physician to hasten the death of 
an individual when outside of the scope of double effect, the physician must comply with patient 
rights to refuse treatment.
120
 It is entirely different, according to the AMA, for the physician to 
take part in the intentional death of the patient.
121
 
II. The Fundamental Inconsistencies in Arguing Against Physician-Assisted Suicide 
Many legal and ethical arguments in favor of passive euthanasia are applied to issues of 
physician-assisted suicide inconsistently. This section will first explore this difference in 
application in terms of Constitutional questions. Though the Constitution is mentioned as a 
source of analysis at the state and federal level, this discussion is misplaced. Even when 
considering due process arguments of liberty, the ultimate question is whether a right to die 
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exists, and consequently, whether that right translates to a right to commit suicide. Scalia finds 
that the Constitution does not provide answers to either of these questions. Therefore, a proper 
analysis of physician-assisted suicide must begin with a state’s right to interfere with such 
behavior. Thus, this section will analyze whether states’ interference with suicide in other 
contexts is consistent with their interpretation and application of the right to interfere with 
physician-assisted suicide. This paper will then address the potential concerns and abuses 
associated with physician-assisted suicide. Finally, this section will analyze causation and intent, 
as well as AMA arguments, and find that the arguments against physician-assisted suicide are 
fundamentally inconsistent with the foundations for which we argue in favor of passive 
euthanasia.  
As Justice Scalia noted in his concurrence in Cruzan, the Constitution is an inappropriate 
foundation for determining rights and legislating in situations in which taking life is the 
objective.
122
 When discussing passive euthanasia, the majority opinion provided that “the United 
States Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse 
lifesaving” treatment.123 As discussed, while this right was once derived from a constitutional 
right to privacy or the doctrine of informed consent, the Cruzan court instead framed the issue as 
a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause.
124
  
Though the majority found that Missouri’s clear and convincing evidence standard for 
surrogate judgment did not violate Cruzan’s right to due process, Scalia noted that a the liberty 
interest at issue is not a right to liberty “simpliciter,” but a “protection against deprivations of 
liberty ‘without due process of law.’”125 Under the Due Process Clause, a substantive claim 
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cannot be successful unless “the State [had] deprived [an individual] of a right historically and 
traditionally protected against state interference.”126 According to Scalia, when a patient seeks to 
have life-sustaining treatment withheld or withdrawn, she fundamentally seeks to commit an act 
of suicide.
127
 Though the act of passive euthanasia may be successfully grounded in the common 
law doctrine of informed consent, in order to examine the due process argument, one must 
analyze whether suicide is a “historically and traditionally” protected right.128 Scalia argues it is 
not.
129
 In common law, suicide has never been an approved act.
130
 Even to commit such an act in 
order “to avoid those ills which [persons] had not the fortitude to endure” has been deemed 
inexcusable.
131
 It is therefore impossible to differentiate between requests for passive euthanasia 
and an act of suicide.  
Although the Constitution is silent, it has been universally accepted that a state may act in 
order to prevent suicide.
132
 Though the state may have a right to interfere with such an act, it is 
within the discretion of the state to choose not to assert that right. Thus, when states exemplify 
their acceptance of suicide in their allowance of passive euthanasia,
133
 the same state’s 
prohibition of physician-assisted suicide on the basis of its right to prevent suicide is illogical 
and inconsistent.  
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Another distinction courts and ethicists draw is that between action and inaction.
134
 
According to Scalia, the logic of this distinction is that suicide is not an “affirmative act” causing 
death, but instead is the inaction found in accepting natural death.
135
 However, this is an 
unpalatable argument as the distinction is found instead between various forms of inaction. 
It would not make much sense to say that one may not kill oneself by walking into 
the sea, but may sit on the beach until submerged by the incoming tide…. [I]n 
other words, the intelligent line does not fall between action and inaction but 
between those forms of inaction that consist of abstaining from “ordinary” care 
and those that consist of abstaining from “excessive” or “heroic” measures.136 
 
However, this proposed distinction is not one to be made through legal analysis.
137
 Irrespective 
of the appropriate arena for this analysis outside of the legal sphere, the indistinction brings 
closer the acts of passive euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. If suicide is the ultimate 
issue, whether it is committed by the discontinuation of artificial nutrition and hydration or 
through ingestion of lethal medication is not relevant. Instead, if we are to allow one, we must 
allow both. And, conversely, if one form is deemed morally unacceptable, then this analysis 
should be applied to the other as well. 
 Scalia’s arguments persuasively establish that, while perhaps permissible, suicide is not 
an act that can be analyzed in the context of the United States Constitution.
138
 This is not to say 
that the failure of equal protection and due process challenges in Quill and Glucksberg were 
incorrectly decided;
139
 rather, these cases were appropriate in light of the fact that there is no 
constitutional issue at hand.
140
 But in rejecting a constitutional argument and providing states 
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with the discretion to legislate in end of life care, states have overlooked the inconsistencies of 
their distinction between passive euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. 
 Many argue that the difference between life-support termination and physician-assisted 
suicide lies in the potentially grave abuses of the latter. However, with respect to actually 
enacting physician-assisted suicide legislation, there are a variety of safeguards to ensure that the 
availability is not abused.
141
 The responsibilities of the physician alone are voluminous in order 
to ensure that the patient is able to retain autonomy in making an informed decision.
142
 
Additionally, there are strict reporting requirements for physicians that not only track the success 
of the initiative but ensure transparency.
143
 Finally, the legislation’s expansive list of definitions 
prevents confusion or exploitation under the Act.
144
 
 Perhaps the only arbitrary definition within the Oregon statute is that of “terminal 
disease.”145 As per the statute, which is mirrored by Washington legislation,146 this diagnosis is 
given to an individual who has “an incurable and irreversible disease that has been medically 
confirmed and will, within reasonable medical judgment, product death within six months.”147 
However, it is incredibly difficult to project this with certainty. In fact, according to Oregon data, 
some individuals who were given a six-month diagnosis not only outlived this projection, but did 
not ingest lethal medication until 1009 days after their first request.
148
 This is more than two 
years longer than the six-month assertion. While this was the longest period noted by Oregon 
data in its fifteen-year history, in 2012 alone there were individuals who did not ingest the 
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medication until 388 days after the first request.
149
 Though it is not within the legislative intent 
for physicians to prescribe lethal medication to individuals outside of the final six-months of life, 
this is not what the statistic suggests. Instead, it establishes the difficulty in estimating how long 
it will take for a disease to take its course.  
This discrepancy should not act as discouragement for purposes of physician-assisted 
suicide. Rather, it can be defended by our choice as a society to trust the judgment of physicians. 
This trust is something we choose to accept in other areas, such as prescribing dangerous 
controlled substances appropriately or determining gestational development. Despite the 
difficulty in making decisions in areas that lack scientific certainty, society has accepted the 
judgment of physicians to make these determinations. At times, the law must defer to medical 
judgment, even in light of the fact that it may not provide complete accuracy.  
As stated in Glucksberg, allowing assisted suicide would pose “profound risks to many 
individuals,” including those who are ill and vulnerable.150 However this is a danger that is 
equally present in situations of passive euthanasia. In the termination of life-supportive measures, 
especially for those who are incompetent and must have a surrogate decision maker, the 
objective is to reject the treatment that is sustaining life. Individuals on life-support are ill and 
vulnerable by definition. However, passive euthanasia is permissible and surrogates are entitled 
to act on behalf of incompetent individuals because the Supreme Court has recognized the right 
of a competent individual to choose to terminate treatment in similar circumstances.
151
  
States have reacted to termination requests by imposing requirements that surrogate 
decision makers must meet in order to establish that it is the wish of the patient, or in the 
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patient’s best interest, to terminate life support.152  Though these requirements may make it 
incredibly difficult for surrogates to meet the states’ standard for decision making in these 
matters, they are permissible in order to protect the interests of an incompetent person.
153
 
However, if these standards are sufficient to protect the interests of an incompetent patient’s 
ultimate right to die, a competent patient could surely assert this right as well. In Death with 
Dignity legislation, the autonomous and informed decision to physician-assisted suicide is 
inherently protected by the very requirements that provide eligibility under the Act.
154
  
In terms of a physician’s moral culpability, physician-assisted suicide is wrong. However, 
it is no more wrong than the acts required in passive euthanasia. Contrary to the current legal 
argument for passive euthanasia, a moral wrong cannot be justified on the basis on informed 
consent. 
The bare difference between killing and letting die does not, in itself, make a 
moral difference. If a doctor lets a patient die, for humane reasons, he is in the 
same moral position as if he had given the patient a lethal injection for humane 
reasons. If his decision was wrong…. the decision would be equally regrettable no 
matter which method was used to carry it out.
155
 
 
The premise creates a conflict with the legally and ethically accepted principle of double effect. 
If we choose to see death as fundamentally wrong in certain circumstances, it cannot be morally 
justified under any principle, including intent. Yet, it is legally and ethically permissible to both 
engage in acts of passive euthanasia as well as acts that can be defended under the principle of 
double effect.
156
 Therefore, death cannot be seen as a universal wrong. Instead, it is judged on 
behalf on the individual who lives the particular life in question.
157
 Thus, if we grant individuals 
                                                 
152
 Id. at 285; In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 360-365 (1985). 
153
 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280. 
154
 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.815 (West 1995). 
155
 Rachels, supra note 1. 
156
 Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 802 (1997); CEJA Report, supra note 9, at 1. 
157
 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 300 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 25 
the privilege to determine whether life is worth living, the privilege must be granted to all 
individuals. 
 This argument of indistinction also directly contradicts the position of the AMA Council 
on Ethics and Judicial Affairs.
158
 The CEJA argues that, based on intent and the physician’s legal 
responsibility to accept a patient’s refusal of care, the physician may not participate in physician-
assisted suicide, but may engage in passive euthanasia.
159
  
This is where the mistake comes in, for what is the cessation of treatment, in these 
circumstances, if it is not the ‘intentional termination of the life of one human 
being by another?’ Of course it is exactly that, and if it were not, there would be 
no point to it.
160
 
 
As expressed, this distinction is morally inappropriate. Physician-assisted suicide is an act that 
hastens death. Withholding or withdrawing the life-supporting treatment of an individual will 
produce an identical result. Therefore, while hastening death is the result, consent to do so in 
passive euthanasia is morally indistinguishable from consent to engage in physician-assisted 
suicide. 
 A stronger argument on behalf of the AMA is the distinction drawn between a patient 
asserting his or her right to refuse treatment and the patient demanding a prescription for lethal 
medication.
161
 At the crux of this argument is why a physician should not have to participate in 
assisted suicide, and for that it is valid. However, practically speaking, no patient may ever make 
such a demand upon a physician. Under Death with Dignity legislation, there is no affirmative 
duty on any physician to participate in any of the procedures.
162
 Additionally, physicians may 
permissibly enact policies on behalf of their entire practice to refrain from participation, despite 
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the views of each individual practitioner associated with the entity.
163
 Therefore, the patient’s 
decision to avail herself to the Death with Dignity Act is not the result of a demand, but rather an 
exploration of options discussed with a consenting physician. 
 Additionally, the AMA’s restriction on the practice of physician-assisted suicide is not a 
universal prohibition. The Oregon Death with Dignity Act provides that no individual will be 
subject to “professional disciplinary action for participating in good faith compliance” with the 
Act.
164
 The AMA recognizes its position relative to the law, and in order to accommodate both, 
suggests that the actual prescriptions for lethal medication be written by nurse practitioners and 
physician assistants in order to protect the physician’s professional ethics. 165  However, 
suggesting subordinates write the prescription is inconsistent with the AMA’s finding that 
physician-assisted suicide is impermissible. 
 The most common distinction between physician-assisted suicide and passive euthanasia 
is that of causation and intent.
166
 As discussed, the intent of the physician should not be a 
distinguishable characteristic in a circumstance in which the patient is consenting to the ultimate 
outcome, namely death. As stated in Quill, “when a patient refuses life-sustaining treatment, he 
dies from an underlying fatal disease or pathology; but if a patient ingests lethal medication 
prescribed by a physician, he is killed by that medication.”167 While this assertion is accurate, the 
Court went on to suggest that the physician’s act in prescribing the medication was the cause of 
death.
168
 This is a mistake. The chain of causation must contain several events in order for the 
patient to end his or her life. It is true that the provision of the prescription initiates this chain, 
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and perhaps is a substantial factor in the outcome. However, in order for death to occur, the 
pharmacist must fill the prescription, the patient must receive the lethal medication, and finally 
the patient must self-administer the medication. If any of these events do not happen, then death 
will not occur. The most important factor in this chain is whether the patient chooses to take the 
lethal medication. Oregon statistics establish that 36 percent of patients do not. Therefore, in 36 
percent of cases, the physician’s act is not the cause of death. The provision of a prescription 
thus cannot be considered the cause of death, as it does not in fact cause death. 
 Finally, the United States allows medical intervention in order to end life in other 
circumstances. A woman’s right to an abortion was initially argued under the right to privacy, 
but like passive euthanasia cases, it was reaffirmed under the liberty interest found in the Due 
Process Clause.
169
 In the case of abortion, which involves the ending of a life, or potential life, 
we allow medical intervention. This intervention is far more direct in ending life than the 
provision of a prescription that an individual may or may not self-administer. Additionally, we 
allow situations of terminal sedation in which a physician may place a patient into a medically 
induced coma prior to removing life-sustaining treatment. While this is often justified in terms of 
preventing pain, it is also a direct action resulting in death. The situation of terminal sedation 
also illustrates the actual action a physician must take in order to remove life-sustaining 
treatment. Typically, terminal sedation is justified through double effect, which, as established is 
morally unsound. Despite our allowance of medical intervention in these situations, opponents of 
physician-assisted suicide still choose to assert the argument that the physician’s action in aiding 
death is what makes assisted-suicide “wrong.” This is fundamentally inconsistent with the 
approach taken for ending life outside of assisted suicide. 
Conclusion  
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Withhold or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment and allowing a patient to die is 
morally indistinguishable from physician-assisted suicide. Ethical and legal analyses that suggest 
the two are dissimilar are misguided because both physician-assisted suicide and passive 
euthanasia are methods used to end life. Attempts to distinguish the two based on causation and 
intent, or action and inaction must fail, as these are not relevant to the ultimate issue of whether a 
physician or patient may engage in an act that will hasten death. If society is willing to defend 
the morality of a physician’s actions in cases of passive euthanasia, then this defense should be 
equally applicable to situations of physician-assisted suicide. However, the moral culpability 
associated with hastening death is inconsistently applied. If an act that hastens death is an 
inappropriate, it must be inappropriate in all circumstances.  
 
